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SUMMARY
Growing concern about the biodiversity crisis has led to
a proliferation of conservation responses, butwithwide
variationbetween countries in the levels of engagement
and investment. Much of this variation is inevitably
attributed to differences between nations in wealth.
However, the relationship between environmentalism
and wealth is complex and it is increasingly apparent
that other factors are also involved. We review
hypotheses that have been developed to explain
variation in broad environmentalism and show that
many of the factors that explain such variation
in individuals, such as wealth, age and experience,
also explain differences between nation states. We
then assess the extent to which these factors explain
variation between nation states in responses to and
investment in the more specific area of biodiversity
conservation. Unexpectedly, quality of governance
explained substantially more variation in public
and state investment in biodiversity conservation
than did direct measures of wealth. The results
informassessments ofwhere conservation investments
might most profitably be directed in the future
and suggest that metrics relating to governance
might be of considerable use in conservation
planning.
Keywords: Convention on Biological Diversity, environment-
alism, governance, post-materialism, GDP, social science,
psychology, priority setting
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that concern for and investment in biodiversity
conservation varies greatly both between individuals and
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between countries, yet the reasons for this variation remain
elusive. The current biodiversity crisis has united the
world’s nations in attempts, thus far with mixed success,
to address it (Butchart et al. 2010). It is apparent that
the response to the problem is occurring at different
rates in different countries and that simple economics are
not the sole determinant of this variation. For example,
richer countries spend more on conservation but have less
biodiversity (McClanahan & Rankin 2016) and national-
level success in protecting threatened species is largely
unrelated to wealth (Rodrigues et al. 2014). National
conservation effort varies by region (Lindsey et al. 2017)
and protected area cover appears to depend mainly upon
an interaction between democratic strength and inequality
(Kashwan 2017). A greater understanding of this variation
in state-level responses to biodiversity conservation might
help identify means to increase the prevalence of positive
conservation efforts (and thereby contribute to Aichi Target
1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity Strategic Plan for
Biodiversity 2011–2020; CBD 2010), as well as being useful
in conservation planning (Eklund et al. 2011; Lindsey et al.
2017).
Although we are not aware of any single overriding theory
to explain national-level variation in conservation responses,
numerous hypotheses have been proposed to account for
the adoption of more general concerns for the environment
and pro-environmental behaviour (‘environmentalism’), both
between individuals and between states (Table 1). The
underlying metrics of such analyses are usually factors such
as energy use, recycling, responses to pollution, willingness
to pay, aesthetic appreciation of nature or ‘biospheric’ values
towards the environment (Steg & Vlek 2009; Raymond &
Kenter 2016). Although there is much overlap, the literature
examining individual-level variation in environmentalism
focuses on personal characteristics and psychological variables
such as attitudes, beliefs, values and norms (Schwartz 1992;
Dietz et al. 2005; Schultz et al. 2005; Heberlein 2012).
In contrast, national-level variation is usually explained by
macro-level socioeconomic drivers (Pisano & Lubell 2017). As
the focus of this study is on national responses to conservation,
we review these socioeconomic theories and use them as the
basis of our analysis.
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Table 1 Some socioeconomic and societal correlates of broad environmentalism identified at national and individual levels. Numbers in
parentheses in the first column link to those listed after the names of the explanatory variables in Table 2 to indicate which factor each
explanatory variable was selected to represent in the models. GDP = gross domestic product.
Factor Relationship with National Individual
environmentalism (across countries) (within country)
Wealth (1) Variable, generally
positive
GDP or rate of economic development
(Gelissen 2007; Givens & Jorgenson
2011)
Personal wealth relative to the national
average (Gelissen 2007; Franzen & Vogl
2013), but see Dunlap and York (2008)
Trust (2) Positive Governance (Harring 2013) Interpersonal trust (Meyer & Liebe 2010;
Franzen & Vogl 2013)
Post-materialism (3) Positive Post-materialism (Gelissen 2007) Post-materialist values (Gelissen 2007;
Franzen & Vogl 2013; Gifford & Nilsson
2014), but see Davis (2000)
Awareness (4) Positive Media coverage of environmental
issues (Harring et al. 2011); national
levels of education (Ignatow 2006)
Individual levels of education (Gelissen
2007; Clements 2012; Franzen & Vogl
2013; Gifford & Nilsson 2014)
Autonomy/maturity (5) Positive Years since independence (Hershfield
et al. 2014); autonomy,
self-expression (Dobewall & Strack
2014)
Sense of control, age, political engagement
(Gelissen 2007; Clements 2012; Gifford &
Nilsson 2014)
Integration (6) Positive Integration with world polity (Boli &
Thomas 1997; Frank et al. 2000;
Givens & Jorgenson 2013); perceived
country age (Hershfield et al. 2014)
Sense of control; responsibility (Gifford &
Nilsson 2014); civic cooperation (Owen &
Videras 2006)
Environmental
experience
Positive Level of environmental degradation
(Givens & Jorgenson 2011)
Childhood exposure to the environment;
proximity to environmental problems
(Gifford & Nilsson 2014)
Religious or political
stance
Variable Religion (Hand & Van Liere 1984);
political system (Nawrotzki 2012)
Religion (Wolkomir et al. 1997; Clements
2012; Manfredo et al. 2016); politics
(Sapiains et al. 2016)
The roots of environmentalism
At least three (not mutually exclusive) theories have
been proposed to explain the development of broad
environmentalism in terms of economic growth. Inglehart
(1995; 2000) proposed that environmental concerns and
corresponding environmental behaviours are the results
of post-materialistic values that are likely to be more
prevalent in wealthier nations: once a certain level of
economic security is met, individuals become free to
develop post-materialistic values, which include support
for movements such as feminism, human rights, animal
welfare and environmentalism (Duroy 2008). The post-
materialist hypothesis receives empirical support from a
number of studies that find a positive relationship between
environmentalism and post-materialist values (Abramson
1997; Kidd & Lee 1997). However, this link has been
challenged (Dietz et al. 2005). For instance, Davis
(2000) found no difference between post-materialists and
materialists in their perceived personal efforts regarding
conservation or general ecological concerns, while Fairbrother
(2013) suggested that environmental concerns are highest
in poorer nations. Inglehart (1995) also acknowledged
that environmental concerns persist in poorer nations,
but suggested that citizens of poorer countries develop
environmental concerns over local issues that directly affect
them, whereas in wealthy nations environmental concern
is more likely to arise as an indirect consequence of
affluence.
The prosperity hypothesis (Diekmann & Franzen 1999)
predicts that environmental concern increases with economic
development as a direct consequence of greater income and
not due to the development of new values. This hypothesis is
based upon standard economic theory, which reasons that the
restoration of a damaged environment is not only a collective
good but also a superior good, for which demand rises with
income (Franzen & Meyer 2010). Consequently, there should
be a positive correlation between a country’s wealth and its
level of environmental responsibility. This is supported by
evidence that pro-environmental views and willingness to pay
for environmental protection increase with wealth both within
and between countries (Kemmelmeier et al. 2002; Franzen
2003; Franzen & Meyer 2010).
Both the post-materialism and prosperity hypotheses are
also used to support the environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) hypothesis, which proposes that whilst environmental
degradation initially rises with increasing income per capita,
degradation levels stabilize before declining at higher income
levels (Grossman & Krueger 1995; Dinda 2004). An EKC has
been identified for some environmental metrics like energy
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use, emissions and water quality (Luzzati & Orsini 2009;
Orubu & Omotor 2011; Apergis & Ozturk 2015), but has been
contested as an empirical illusion (Stern 2004) and fails to
appear in other studies with the same or other environmental
indicators (Koop & Tole 1999; Kijima et al. 2010; Ozturk
& Al-Mulali 2015), including those related to conservation
(Dietz & Adger 2003; Mills & Waite 2009).
All economic explanations of environmentalism face the
inherent contradiction that while concern for the environment
may increase with greater wealth, so too does environmental
destruction, since economic development has been identified
as one of the strongest correlates of biodiversity loss (Dietz
et al. 2007; Bradshaw et al. 2010). Furthermore, these
affluence-based hypotheses have been challenged by Dunlap
and Mertig (1997) and Dunlap and York (2008), whose
globalization hypothesis posits that environmental concerns
are no longer confined to post-materialistic elites within
wealthy nations and that there is no clear correlation between
wealth and environmental concern.
Although none can be entirely divorced from economics,
numerous other socioeconomic patterns have been proposed
to explain environmentalism, both between and within nations
(Table 1). Pinker (2011) argues that long-term declines in
human violence can be linked to a number of ‘civilizing’
historical and social trends, such as the development of
the modern nation state and its associated judiciary, the
empowerment of women and advances in education. Closely
following the trend of declining violence against humans,
Pinker (2011) argues, is a decline in violence against
animals and, perhaps in the longer term, this extends to a
decline in violence against the environment. Pinker’s (2011)
ideas overlap with the principles of world polity theory
that highlights the global cultural diffusion of accepted
institutional structures and modes of thinking (Shandra 2007;
Givens & Jorgenson 2013) and how international organizations
such as the UN fund and support domestic environmentalism
as part of a ‘world environmental regime’ (Longhofer &
Schofer 2010). World polity theory might explain why
even countries with negligible interests in environmental
matters generally have a government department charged with
overseeing such issues.
A nation’s linkage to world society is a strong predictor
of the number of international environmental treaties it has
ratified (Frank 1999) and its level of environmental concern
(Longhofer & Schofer 2010). Global institutionalization of the
principle that nations bear responsibility for environmental
protection may be more influential in driving national
conservation agendas than the domestic processes of
increasing affluence or environmental degradation (Frank
et al. 2000). Both Pinker’s (2011) civilizing process and world
polity theory require significant time over which to evolve,
perhaps explaining why the age or perceived age of a country is
positively correlated with environmentalism (Hershfield et al.
2014).
Developing an overarching theory may be problematic
given that other historical (Grove 1996; Adams et al. 2004),
political (Heath & Gifford 2006; Sapiains et al. 2016) and
religious traditions (White 1967; Hand & Van Liere 1984)
also shape environmental concerns and values both within
and between countries (Manfredo et al. 2016). Moreover, the
direction of predictors of environmentalism can vary across
countries with different income levels (Nawrotzki 2012) or
within countries over time (Kahn 2002; Franzen & Vogl 2013).
Furthermore, it appears that environmental concern does not
always predict pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz et al.
2005; Steg & Vlek 2009; Heberlein 2012; Everard et al. 2016).
We assess the performance of these key hypotheses
developed to explain the variation in broad environmentalism
for explaining country-level variation in the more specific area
of biodiversity conservation. While the drivers of variation in
responses to biodiversity and wildlife have been explored in
local contexts (Johansson et al. 2013; Kansky et al. 2014) and
predictors of broad environmentalism have been assessed at
a multinational level (Gelissen 2007; Nawrotzki 2012; Givens
& Jorgenson 2013; Harring 2013; Hershfield et al. 2014),
studies of conservation responses at the national level are
sparse. To our knowledge, the only conservation-specific
response metrics that have been considered on a national
level are biodiversity loss (Shandra et al. 2009; Butchart et al.
2010; Rodrigues et al. 2014), domestic conservation spending
(McClanahan & Rankin 2016), protected area cover (Kashwan
2017) and a composite of these three metrics specifically
with regards to megafauna conservation (Lindsey et al.
2017). As previous studies of environmental behaviours show
that different metrics respond to different socioeconomic
drivers and influences (Hadler & Haller 2011), we consider
multiple metrics of conservation responses. Specifically, we
aim to further the understanding of the variation in country-
level conservation efforts by assessing together additional
and previously unconsidered metrics of national-level
conservation responses alongside explanatory socioeconomic
variables used in previous studies to predict variation between
nations in broad environmentalism (Table 1).
METHODS
We collected socioeconomic and historical data for each of
the world’s nation states and used these in a multivariate
regression analysis to model a number of variables related to
national-level conservation responses or performance. Details
of the response and explanatory variables selected, their
sources and the specific hypotheses they were selected to
test are given in Table 2. All analyses were conducted in R
3.0.1 (R Development Core Team 2014); model selection
was implemented using the package ‘MuMIn’ (Barton´
2012). We modelled seven country-level response variables:
per capita membership of environmental non-governmental
organizations (NGOs); the number of International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) organizations operating in
the country; the extent to which Aichi Biodiversity Target 11
to protect biomes has been met; an index of ecosystem vitality;
governmental spend on domestic conservation; governmental
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Table 2 Descriptions and sources of the response and explanatory variables used in the analyses. For the explanatory variables, the numbers in
parentheses after the variable name link to those given in Table S1 to indicate which factor previously shown to predict broad environmentalism
each was chosen to test. Small or non-independent polities (e.g. San Marino, Gibraltar) and recently created states that are included in the
CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook) but for which many variables were missing (e.g. South
Sudan, Somaliland) were removed from the analysis (n = 14). GDP = gross domestic product; IUCN = International Union for Conservation
of Nature; NGO = non-governmental organization.
Variable name Description and source
Response variables
NGO membership Membership of the national partner of BirdLife International. Use of environmental association as a metric
for civic environmentalism follows Dalton (2005) and Longhofer and Schofer (2010), 2014 values
IUCN organizations Number of IUCN organizations, taken from the IUCN Members’ Database
(https://www.iucn.org/about/union/members/who-are-our-members). Use of environmental NGO
presence as a measure of environmental concern follows Smith and Wiest (2005) and Givens and
Jorgenson (2013), 2014 values
% Aichi Target 11
achieved
Extent (%) to which each country has met Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity for protecting 17% of each biome at a national level (CBD 2010). One of the indices comprises
the wider Ecosystem Vitality Index, which in turn combines with a number of metrics on human health
and well-being to comprise the Environmental Performance Index 2014 (http://epi.yale.edu/data). We
consider this a more comprehensive metric of biodiversity protection than simply percentage of protected
area cover (e.g. Kashwan 2017)
Ecosystem vitality A composite of the previous index with further indices on ecosystem protection and on water, agriculture,
forests, fisheries, climate and energy. This represents an index of broader ecosystem and
biodiversity-influencing issues than the previous index (http://epi.yale.edu/data), 2014 values
Domestic conservation
spending
Domestic conservation spending in millions of US dollars, taken from Waldron et al. (2013), following
Vincent et al. (2014) and McClanahan and Rankin (2016)
Multilateral agreements The number of multilateral environmental agreements signed, from a set of 25. Examples include the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). Data are taken from the environmental sustainability-adjusted Global
Competitiveness Index (2013–2014 edition). The use of multilateral agreements as a national-level
environmental response follows Neumayer (2002a)
Environmental
enforcement
Enforcement of environmental regulations. This score is a component in the environmental
sustainability-adjusted GCI (2013–2014 edition). It is obtained from the World Economic Forum,
Executive Opinion Survey, 2011 and 2012 editions. Scores are within-country averages of assessments of
enforcement from 1 = very lax to 7 = among the world’s most rigorous. Following Dasgupta et al. (2001)
and Rivera and Oh (2013)
Explanatory variables
GDP (1) GDP in US dollars, 2013 estimates (World Bank). Linear and quadratic terms included
Per-capita GDP (1) Per-capita GDP in US dollars corrected for purchasing power parity, 2013 estimates (World Bank;
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD). For the small number of countries
without estimates, the uncorrected per-capita GDP was entered to maintain sample sizes. Linear and
quadratic terms were included
Country age (5) Age of country as given in the CIA World Factbook as of 2014
Globalization (4, 6) Swiss Economic Institute Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006), 2012 values. This index measures a
country’s level of economic, social and political globalization and includes data on economic flows and
restrictions, information flow and cultural proximity
Governance (2, 5, 6) Worldwide governance indicators (World Bank). These indicators score countries on six measures of
governance: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. Each measure is scaled in the
same way; we used the 2012 average across all six measures
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators)
Development (1, 4) Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme). A composite statistic of life
expectancy, education and income indices, 2013 values
Post-materialism (3) Most recent value for each country from either the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010–2014) or the World
Values Survey Wave 5 (2005–2009). Because of the small sample size, this variable was tested in a
separate set of analyses (Table S4)
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adoption of multilateral environmental agreements; and the
enforcement of environmental regulations. These variables
were selected because they include independent metrics
that relate to a range of public and national responses
to the biodiversity crisis, which have previously not been
considered together in similar analyses. Additionally, data
were available for each variable for a sufficiently large number
of countries (over 90) to allow multivariate modelling. The
seven response variables were not strongly inter-correlated
(Table S1, available online). Based on previous studies of
variation between nations in broad environmentalism and the
hypotheses already reviewed (Table 1), we initially considered
seven explanatory variables: gross domestic product (GDP);
per-capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity);
country age; level of globalization; quality of governance;
level of human development; and degree of post-materialism
(Table 2). The Human Development Index was highly
correlated with both per-capita GDP and globalization
(r >0.8; Table S2) and therefore excluded, as data were
available for fewer countries. The small sample size (n = 76
countries) of the only available multinational metric of post-
materialism meant that including this variable in analyses
would reduce statistical power. Thus, we assessed two sets
of models: one fitting the five explanatory variables with
large sample sizes (GDP, per-capita GDP, country age,
globalization and governance) and the other with these five
variables plus post-materialism. We included linear and
quadratic terms of GDP and per-capita GDP to assess
evidence of EKCs (Grossman & Krueger 1995). We also tested
interaction terms between: (i) GDP and governance; and (ii)
per-capita GDP and governance.
We used generalized linear models (GLMs) to model each
response variable as a function of the two sets of explanatory
variables. We standardized all explanatory variables to
compare the effect size among explanatory variables and
normalized GDP, per-capita GDP and country age using log10
transformation. Because NGO membership and the number
of IUCN organizations are likely to vary with population size
and because we could not model the per-capita values of these
because per-capita GDP was included as a predictor (thus
meaning that population size would appear on both sides
of the regression equation, causing spurious correlations),
the population size of each nation was also included as a
predictor in these models to control for its effect, though
we do not report its result. Statistical distributions assumed
in the GLMs were based on the type of the response variables:
normal for log10-transformed NGO membership, ecosystem
vitality and environmental enforcement; negative binomial
for the IUCN organizations; binomial for Aichi Target
11 progress and multilateral agreements; and Gamma for
square root-transformed domestic conservation spending. We
adopted a model selection approach (Burnham & Anderson
2002). We generated a set of models with all possible
parameter subsets, which were then fitted to the data using
the GLMs and ranked by QAICc (the difference between
each model’s corrected quasi-likelihood Akaike information
criterion (QAICc) and QAICcmin, that of the ‘best’ model)
for binomial GLMs to deal with over-dispersion and AICc
for others. We report the top ten models or all models with
AICc orQAICc values<2 for each analysis. To investigate
the effect of spatial autocorrelation, we calculated Moran’s
I for the residuals from the full models using the package
‘ncf’ (Bjørnstad 2005) in R. The calculated Moran’s I was
small (|Moran’s I| <0.3) up to the first 14 000 km in all the
databases, indicating no more than a weak autocorrelation.
Thus, we did not consider spatial autocorrelation explicitly in
the models.
Considering the relatively strong positive correlations
between governance, per-capita GDP and globalization (r =
0.71–0.77; Table S2), we also adopted a variation partitioning
approach (Borcard et al. 1992) to assess the unique and
shared contributions of these three explanatory variables
to explaining between-nation variation in conservation
responses. We used R2 for GLMs assuming normal
distribution (NGO membership, ecosystem vitality and
environmental enforcement) and McFadden’s pseudo-R2 for
others. We excluded the quadratic and interaction terms of
per-capita GDP.
RESULTS
Model selection yielded strong support for an effect of
governance in explaining variation in almost all the response
variables modelled. Governance was the only explanatory
variable that was included in all models of all response
variables with AICc or QAICc values <2 (Table S3). The
response variables all showed a strong positive association with
governance (Fig. 1(a)). The results also identified GDP as a
significant predictor, as it was included in more than half the
models with AICc or QAICc values <2, including the best
models of six response variables (Fig. 1(b), Table S3).
The same key role of governance was found in the models
that included a measure of post-materialism, except in the
case of the number of IUCN organizations (Table S4). Post-
materialism itself failed to explain significant variation in any
of the response variables (Table S4). We did not find clear
evidence of an EKC for any of our conservation response
variables besides ecosystem vitality, for which there was a
weak indication of an EKC.
The variation partitioning showed that the unique
contribution of governance was higher than that of per-capita
GDP and globalization in accounting for variation in four of
the seven response variables. However, for all but one response
variable the variation was best explained by the three variables
(governance, per-capita GDP and globalization) combined,
rather than any one of them alone (Fig. 2).
DISCUSSION
Our analyses yielded equivocal support for the largely
economic hypotheses that have been developed to explain
variation in broad environmentalism. GDP received support
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Figure 1 Relationships between seven response variables reflecting
conservation concerns and (a) governance, (b) GDP, (c) per-capita
GDP, (d) country age and (e) globalization. Lines represent
regression lines based on the estimated coefficients in the best
models (Table S3). Lines are not shown for variables not included
in the best models. The y-axes differ between response variables.
GDP = gross domestic product; IUCN = International Union for
Conservation of Nature; NGO = non-governmental organization;
USD = US dollars.
in models of only some response variables, including for
conservation spending, mirroring the results of McClanahan
and Rankin (2016). Post-materialism failed to explain variation
in any of the variables modelled. Globalization also failed to
garner much support from the data as being a useful predictor.
Country age was the best predictor of the number of IUCN
organizations within a country, which lends support to the
observation by Herschfield et al. (2014) that country age
is a predictor of public environmental concern. However,
country age was a poor predictor of other conservation metrics
and effective environmental organization may not necessarily
reflect underlying public environmental concern (Longhofer
& Schofer 2010). Instead, governance was found to be the
best predictor across almost all variables, suggesting that
world polity theory and Pinker’s (2011) ‘civilising process’
might be useful frameworks with which to explore further
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0.058 0.002
0.023
0.001
0.079 −0.001
0.259
(a)  NGO membership
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0 0.009
0.077
0.002
0.02 −0.007
0.069
(b)  IUCN organizations
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0.027 0
0
0
0.013 0
0.032
(c)  % Aichi Target achieved
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0.014 0.005
0.064
0.007
0.071 0.045
0.315
(d)  Ecosystem vitality
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0.007 0.034
0.013
0.01
0.023 0.061
0.349
(e)  Domestic conservation spending
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0.061 0.026
0.034
−0.011
0.112 −0.022
0.125
(f)  Multilateral agreements
Governance                  Per−capita GDP
Globalization
0.27 0.001
0.001
0.004
0.095 0.002
0.335
(g)  Environmental enforcements
Figure 2 Results of variation partitioning for (a) NGO
membership, (b) IUCN organizations, (c) % Aichi Target achieved,
(d) ecosystem vitality, (e) domestic conservation spending, (f)
multilateral agreements and (g) environmental enforcements, in
terms of fractions of variation explained independently and jointly
by governance, per-capita GDP and globalization. GDP = gross
domestic product; IUCN = International Union for Conservation
of Nature; NGO = non-governmental organization.
the between-nation variation in conservation responses and
performance. The extent to which governance was a better
predictor of responses to biodiversity conservation than
economic wealth was unexpected and cannot be explained
by covariance between governance, per-capita GDP and
globalization, since variation partitioning revealed that, in
four out of the seven response variables, the independent
contribution of governance to explaining variation in response
variables was far greater than that of the other two variables.
Governance has been shown to be an important predictor
of biodiversity loss (Smith et al. 2003), deforestation rates
(Wright et al. 2007; Umemiya et al. 2010), protected
area effectiveness (Barnes et al. 2016) and poaching (Burn
et al. 2011), but as far as we are aware, ours is the first
analysis to suggest that governance outperforms more purely
economic variables in explaining a range of metrics of
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conservation effort and investment across most of the world’s
nations.
Although the causal links between governance and
biodiversity conservation remain unclear, there are several
plausible mechanisms. The relationship between biodiversity
and corruption is complex and poorly understood (Smith &
Walpole 2005; Barrett et al. 2006), but willingness to make
economic sacrifices for environmental protection appears to
be strongly affected by individual political trust (Harring
2013). The over-centralization typical of countries with lower
governance scores may inhibit local conservation actions
(Everard 2015; Zheng & Cao 2015) and in these states
conservation policy may not be supported by the development
of legal standards and procedures (Otto et al. 2011). Effective
governance might promote the growth of agricultural yields
while minimizing the spread of uncontrolled, particularly
damaging agriculture (Ceddia et al. 2014). Internal strife
and conflict, the rates of which are explicitly captured in
governance statistics, have generally negative impacts on
biodiversity (Dudley et al. 2002). On a local scale, better
governance may increase the strength of local institutions and
improve common-pool resource management, particularly
where property rights are lacking (Ostrom et al. 2007).
Likewise, less effective governance undermines sustainable
harvest (Nelson et al. 2013; Schuhbauer & Sumaila 2016)
and incentive-based conservation (Ebeling & Yasué 2009;
Duchelle et al. 2014). Finally, improved quality of governance
may be associated with greater engagement with international
conservation agreements. For example, European countries
must achieve an acceptable level of governance before they can
accede to the European Union, upon which they are bound
to strict conservation legislation that has been shown to be
successful (Donald et al. 2007), although such legislation is
not always enforced (López-Bao et al. 2015). Democracies
perform better than other systems of government in joining
and implementing international conservation agreements and
in protecting land for wildlife (Neumayer 2002a).
Our finding that globalization correlates with some con-
servation responses (multilateral agreements and ecosystem
vitality) corroborates Neumayer (2002b), who found a positive
association between trade openness and the ratification
of multilateral environmental agreements. However, the
absence of a relationship between globalization and our other
response variables suggests that economic, social and political
connectivity by themselves do not increase conservation
efforts. Instead, if conservation responses have spread around
the globe, it might be down to the influence of specific
actors, such as international environmental organizations
(Shandra et al. 2009; Givens & Jorgenson 2013). Given the
significance of governance identified here, the influence of
world polity on conservation may also have occurred indirectly
via the building of conservation capacity through democratic
institutions and governance systems (Dunlap & York 2008).
This link is supported by the finding that international NGOs
help reduce deforestation and do so increasingly at higher
levels of democracy (Shandra 2007).
Conservation responses may also be influenced by other
forms of capacity, however. Environmental organizations,
for example, appears to depend heavily on the availability
of financial resources, the concentration of individuals in
populated urban areas (Gillham 2008) and levels of education
and awareness (Brady et al. 1995; Duroy 2008). These
factors, which we did not specifically test here, might also
account for why the number of IUCN organizations did not
correlate with governance as strongly as our other response
variables. Furthermore, all these factors identified that occur
at the national level may overshadow the influence of post-
materialist values at the individual level (Kemmelmeier et al.
2002), thus perhaps explaining why we fail to find an
effect of post-materialism here. Alternatively, this might be
because conservation problems have both materialist and
non-materialist dimensions in both rich and poor nations
(Martinez-Alier & Guha 1997; Dunlap & York 2008). Indeed,
the range of conservation motivations is reflected in the
many types of (materialist and non-materialist) ecosystem
services identified across all societies (Crossman et al. 2013;
Raymond & Kenter 2016). Moreover, given that post-
materialist values and resulting environmental behaviours are
supposed to be the products of prosperity (Inglehart 1995;
2000), the lack of a clear relationship between our conservation
responses and per-capita wealth refutes the post-materialism
hypothesis.
We also found no evidence for an EKC for conservation
responses. Ecosystem vitality was the only variable that
showed a relationship resembling a weak EKC, but this effect
may be down to the indices of water pollution and air quality,
which make up the majority of the ecosystem vitality index
(Morse 2017) and have previously been found to follow the
EKC, rather than biodiversity. Along with economic growth
driving increasing environmental concern and demand, a key
tenant of the EKC, is that technological progress eventually
reduces environmental degradation. However, technological
progress has not yet produced similar results for conservation,
owing to slow speciation rates (Dietz & Adger 2003),
competitive exclusion of non-human species and challenges
involved in habitat restoration (Czech 2008), which might
explain the lack of an EKC for biodiversity metrics. Indeed,
wealth appears only to start reducing biodiversity loss once
a minimal level of institutional quality has been achieved
(Gren et al. 2016), again emphasizing the significance of
governance in determining conservation outcomes. However,
our other responses, which relate more to conservation
concern and effort, also showed no EKC relationship. This
finding suggests that conservation efforts will not readily
decline as poorer nations develop and that greater wealth does
not necessarily inspire greater conservation efforts, despite
the notion that richer people may be more willing to pay
for conservation (Jacobsen & Hanley 2009; Franzen & Meyer
2010). Lastly, again departing from an EKC, some poorer
nations may prioritize conservation for economic reasons
(such as ecotourism) and, unlike other forms of environmental
degradation, the direct links between biodiversity loss and
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Figure 3 The global distribution of the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators (2013 values).
human well-being (Díaz et al. 2006) may be appreciated
differently by citizens and policy makers across the world.
We did not identify inequality as being one of the
key hypothesized drivers of environmentalism (hence we
did not account for it in our analysis), but inequality
may also influence conservation responses. Environmental
performance of nations appears to increase with equality
(Morse 2017), but protected area cover also depends on
the strength of democracy (Kashwan 2017). In countries
with strong democracies, low inequality is associated with
higher protected area cover, but in weak democracies, higher
inequality is associated with greater protected area cover
(Kashwan 2017), possibly because establishing conservation
areas may be easier in areas of weaker property rights,
greater power associated with elites (including environmental
organizations) (Sandbrook 2017) and limited civic ability
to contest (Kashwan 2017). This result challenges our
findings by demonstrating that some conservation responses
can proliferate under less effective governance. However,
protected area cover is also associated with remoteness (Joppa
& Pfaff 2009) and tourism attractiveness (Baldi et al. 2017),
suggesting a degree of strategic planning or opportunism that
deserves greater exploration. Besides, the size of protected
area coverage is not necessarily indicative of its quality (De
Santo 2013); instead, local governance seems to be a key
driver of conservation and social outcomes (Oldekop et al.
2016).
Wealthier countries tend on average to have higher levels
of governance, but there is a sufficient number of wealthy
countries with less effective governance and poor countries
with effective governance to justify treating governance as
an informative metric in its own right and not simply a
surrogate of wealth. Given the importance of governance in
explaining countries’ conservation responses and investment,
this provides important insights into future changes in global
conservation activities. Many countries in biodiversity-rich
regions, such as South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America and the Caribbean, now have rapidly growing
economies, posing serious threats to biodiversity in these
regions (Bradshaw et al. 2010). However, governance in
these regions is generally low (Fig. 3), suggesting that their
levels of positive conservation responses and investment are
unlikely to increase in the near future. This suggests a further
challenge to achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, which
aim to improve the status of biodiversity and enhance the
implementation of effective biodiversity strategies and action
plans by 2020 (CBD 2010).
Nonetheless, governance is dynamic and can change
within countries over time (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
Whilst the potential for improved governance is encouraging
for conservation, periods of instability and armed conflict
can easily threaten biodiversity (Loucks et al. 2009;
Brashares et al. 2014) and even in wealthy, well-governed
states environmental regulations can readily be disregarded,
diminished and discarded (López-Bao et al. 2015; Chapron
et al. 2017). Wealthy, well-governed states may also appear
to superficially improve their conservation performance by
transferring the ecological footprint of their consumption
and industry to poorer, less well-governed nations in
‘unequal ecological exchange’ (Jorgenson 2016). Scrutinizing
such patterns further and improving the transparency
of transnational supply chains would help tackle this
problem. The nature of conservation governance is also
subject to change (Agrawal et al. 2008; Duffy 2014)
with sometimes unintended negative consequences, such
as perverse incentives (Gordon et al. 2015) or stakeholder
resentment (Bennet & Dearden 2014). Existing local
governance structures can also outperform centralized
state regimes (such as protected areas) in some places
(Schleicher et al. 2017). These effects should be appreciated
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when considering new forms of environmental governance,
including digital crypto-governance, which has been tipped to
improve environmental record keeping and reduce corruption
with blockchain technology (Chapron 2017). The digital world
is also increasingly offering new ways for individuals to
engage with conservation online, presenting opportunities for
increased participation (Baynham-Herd 2017), but also new
challenges, including for conservation governance (Büscher
2017).
We suggest that metrics relating to governance might
also be of considerable use in conservation planning. Like
economic costs (Naidoo et al. 2006), governance scores could
be used for assessing where conservation investments and
capacity building would most profitably be directed and
for determining the types of conservation action (capacity
development or practical delivery) that are most likely to bear
fruit (Eklund et al. 2011; Garnett et al. 2011). Indeed, there is
evidence that international aid for biodiversity conservation is
already being targeted at recipient countries that have higher
levels of governance (Miller et al. 2013). Wider recognition of
the link between governance and conservation may encourage
greater collaboration between conservation interests and those
working to promote better governance. Environmental NGOs
have already contributed to this process and have helped
construct a world polity that speeds up the transfer of
conservation as a universal principle between nations (Boli
& Thomas 1997; Longhofer & Schofer 2010; Givens &
Jorgenson 2013). At the local level, working to improve
conservation governance might also prove more productive
than trying to generate shifts in conservation values (Manfredo
et al. 2017). Lastly, we suggest our findings should promote
further scrutiny regarding the notion that through economic
growth alone we will escape from this biodiversity crisis.
There is more to conservation than markets: governance must
be considered alongside growth.
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